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ARGUMENT 
I. EVEN WITH THE STATE'S MISREPRESENTATIONS AND 
OMISSIONS, THE EVIDENCE, AS MARSHALED, IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DETERMINATION THAT MR. POWELL KNOWINGLY AND 
INTENTIONALLY POSSESSED THE FIREARM. 
The State argues that the evidence was sufficient to convict 
Mr. Powell for illegal possession of a firearm. See Brief of 
Appellee, pp. 8-13. In the course of its argument, the State, as 
demonstrated below, misrepresents and omits various critical 
facts. 
The State argues that Mr. Powell had knowledge of the 
firearm's presence because his cigarette rolling papers were 
located in the same backpack as Ms. Shannon Stewart's firearm. 
By so arguing, the State implies that the firearm was in plain 
view and easily accessible. Contrary to the State's assertions, 
Ms. Stewart's firearm was neither in plain sight nor was it easily 
accessible (See R. 93, p. 12, lines 7-25). Rather, Ms. Stewart's 
firearm was located in a separate zippered, self-contained, black-
colored fanny pack inside its own shoulder-strap holster, which, 
in turn, was located in the Mark colored back pack." (See id.). 
The State, in its Brief, makes little effort to cite to State 
Vo Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P. 2d 911, which is the Utah Supreme 
Court's most recent pronouncement concerning the legal principles 
of constructive possession. In Layman, the defendant was 
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convicted of a drug possession charge on a theory of constructive 
possession. Like this case, the evidence presented against the 
defendant was circumstantial. Among other things, when the woman 
who actually possessed the drugs in Layman was asked by the 
officer if he could see the pouch, which he later found to contain 
the illegal substance, she looked at the defendant and he "shook 
his head in a negative fashion for an unspecified length of time.'7 
Id. at f8. Affirming this court's reversal of Layman's 
conviction, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was 
legally insufficient to warrant drawing an inference of 
constructive possession. Id. at ifl6. The Court stated: 
We conclude that the court of appeals 
properly found the evidence in this case is 
insufficient. When all the brush is cleared, 
the critical fact is that there was little 
evidence to prove that Michael had such 
control over Gina's person that one could 
reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he knowingly and intentionally possessed 
the drugs and paraphernalia in her pouch. 
The only fact tending to prove Michael's 
control over Gina is that she looked at him 
when the deputy requested to see the pouch 
and that Michael shook his head in a negative 
fashion. This simply is not enough. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court in Layman both reaffirmed and solidified the 
requirement that to prove constructive possession, wit is 
necessary that xthere [be] a sufficient nexus between the accused 
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and the [item allegedly possessed] to permit an inference that the 
accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control . . . .'" Id. at fl3 (quoting State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 
319 (Utah 1985)); see also United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 
549 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 
1403, 1431 (10th Cir. 1990) J.1 Moreover, there must be facts that 
show the accused intended to use the allegedly possessed item, 
which in this case is the firearm, as his own. See id.2 The 
State must prove the elements of constructive possession beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See id. at ffl2 and 16. 
In the instant case, the State had to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the firearm was subject to Mr. Powell's 
1In the course of discussing the type of nexus referred to in 
State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, fl3, 985 P.2d 911, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that the State 
cannot rest its case on "the mere circumstance that a defendant was 
close to or had access to the illegal items;" rather "there must be 
xxsome action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual 
to the [illegal items] and indicates that he had some stake in the 
them, some power over them.'7" United States v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249, 
252 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1087, 
1089 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 
549 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) . 
2In State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P. 2d 911, the Court 
recognized that the determination concerning the existence of a 
sufficient nexus for constructive possession is a "highly fact-
sensitive determination." Id. at fl4. The Court also noted that 
while the different factors listed in previous cases might be of help 
in guiding the fact finder, "[t]hey are not universally pertinent 
factors, and they are not legal elements of constructive possession 
in any context." See id. 
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dominion and control, and that Mr. Powell had the intent to 
exercise that control. The record demonstrates that there was 
little, if any, evidence to prove that Mr. Powell knew of the 
firearm's location in the vehicle so that one could reasonably 
infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and 
intentionally possessed the firearm located in Ms. Stewart's fanny 
pack, which, in turn, was located inside her back pack. 
The only facts tending to prove Mr. Powell's control over the 
firearm are the proximity of the back pack and Mr. Powell's 
insistence that the firearm was not loaded when he was informed by 
Officer Anderson about the loaded firearm found in the vehicle. 
That simply is not enough to establish the requisite nexus between 
Mr. Powell and the firearm to permit a reasonable inference that 
Mr. Powell knowingly and intentionally possessed the firearm. See 
Layman, 1999 UT 79 at fl5; Fox, 709 P.2d at 318. 
All the other evidence in this case lends little or nothing 
to the critical factual issue. At the very least, the other 
evidence is inconclusive as to whether Mr. Powell knew or intended 
to possess the firearm and, in many instances, the other evidence 
supports the determination that he did not knowingly or 
intentionally possess the firearm. For example, while the vehicle 
was registered in Mr. Powell's name, both Mr. Powell and Ms. 
Stewart shared the vehicle (R. 93, p. 39, lines 4-10). In fact, 
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Ms. Stewart had used the vehicle earlier that day after which she 
inadvertently left her back pack in the vehicle (R. 93, p. 41).3 
Many of these facts are made all that more credible by the fact 
that Ms. Stewart, at the time of trial, was an adverse witness to 
Mr. Powell by virtue of the protective order she had sought 
against him prior to trial (See R. 93, p. 38). 
The State argues that Mr. Powell exhibited incriminating 
conduct and made incriminating statements during the investigation 
of the vehicle. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 10-12. However, Mr. 
Powell's conduct, if anything, supports his lack of knowledge 
concerning the firearm. Although the officers allowed Mr. Powell 
to return to the vehicle to assist in moving it from the highway, 
Mr. Powell made absolutely no effort to remove or conceal the back 
pack, which contained the firearm (R. 93, p. 68). Instead, Mr. 
Powell allowed the back pack to remain next to him in the adjacent 
passenger seat (See id.). Furthermore, in the course of the 
investigation, Mr. Powell readily admitted to smoking marijuana a 
few days prior to the accident (R. 93, pp. 6-8). Additionally, 
when informed by Officer Anderson that he had found the firearm in 
the vehicle, Mr. Powell spontaneously denied ownership of the 
firearm and uttered that Ms. Stewart "had put the gun in the car." 
3Ms. Stewart incontrovertibly testified that she owned both the 
firearm and the back pack in which the firearm was contained (R. 93, 
pp. 39-41) . 
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(See R. 93, pp. 15-16). Cf. State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1389 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) . 
Viewing the evidence presented as a whole, no reasonable 
inference can be drawn that Mr. Powell knowingly and intentionally 
possessed the firearm. See Layman, 1999 UT 79 at fl6; see also 
State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, f^l6, 3 P. 3d 725. The firearm 
was neither in plain view nor was it easily accessible to Mr. 
Powell. Indeed, there was no circumstantial evidence that Mr. 
Powell even knew that the firearm was in the vehicle. Rather, the 
foregoing evidence demonstrates his ignorance that the firearm was 
located in the back pack let alone the vehicle. 
"An appellate court should overturn a conviction for 
insufficient evidence when it is apparent that there is not 
sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the crime 
charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant committed the crime." Such is the case here. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT NOT ONLY VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22(a) WHEN IT SENTENCED MR. 
POWELL, BUT IT VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO DUE PROCESS. 
The State argues that the trial court did not plainly error 
when it sentenced Mr. Powell because it heard from appointed trial 
counsel and the State, through appointed counsel. See Brief of 
Appellee, pp. 13-16. However, the affirmative obligation imposed 
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upon the trial court by Rule 22 (a) and prior case law indicate 
otherwise. 
In State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615, cert. 
granted, 43 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002), the trial court proceeded and 
imposed sentence upon the defendant, who was voluntarily absent. 
Id. at Kf4-5. The defendant, Mr. Wanosik, appealed, arguing, 
among other things, that "the trial court erred by the manner in 
which it conducted sentencing." Id. at ^[7. 
In its analysis of the sentencing procedure, this Court held 
that Utah Rule of Criminal 22(a)4 "imposes an affirmative 
obligation on the trial court to extend the opportunity to be 
heard" and that Rule 22 "does not contemplate the court will 
passively wait for counsel to make a request to be heard." Id. at 
1(32. This Court further stated, "The onus is thus on the trial 
court to 'afford7 the defendant and to 'give' the prosecutor the 
opportunity to present relevant information." Id. (citation and 
4Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states, in 
relevant part: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall 
afford the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal 
cause why sentence should not be imposed. The 
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material 
to the imposition of sentence. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). 
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footnote omitted); see also State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 
(Utah 1985) (holding that predecessor statute "directs trial 
courts to hear evidence from both the defendant and the 
prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to be imposed."). 
After concluding that the trial court's noncompliance with Rule 
22(a) was not harmless, this Court vacated Mr. Wanosik's sentences 
and remanded for resentencing. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at f33. 
At sentencing in the instant case, the trial court knew that 
Mr. Powell was involuntarily absent (See R. 94, Tab 7, p. 1); see 
also R. 59-60, Consent to Sentencing in Absentia). After briefly 
discussing Mr. Powell's involuntary absence and the consent to 
sentencing in absentia, the trial court immediately proceeded to 
impose sentence (See R. 94, Tab 7, pp. 1-3) . Contrary to the 
State's assertion, however, the trial court, prior to imposing 
sentence, failed to illicit from either defense counsel or the 
prosecutor "any information in mitigation of punishment" or "any 
[other] information material to the imposition of sentence." See 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Moreover, at no time during the 
sentencing hearing did the court reference the Presentence 
Investigation Report, which had been previously prepared for the 
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very purpose of sentencing (See R. 73-94, Presentence 
Investigation Report).5 
By not providing the opportunity to present information 
material to sentencing, the trial court precluded the presentation 
of mitigating circumstances and thus alternative considerations 
for sentencing.6 Rather, the trial court proceeded directly to 
sentencing without any other consideration. 
The plain error analysis of the Wanosik case is premised upon 
the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the predecessor statute 
to Rule 22(a) in State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). 
See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f32 & n.12, 31 P.3d 615. Moreover, 
the Wanosik opinion is based, at least in large part, on the plain 
5The State argues that the trial court apparently referred to the 
PSI in the course of sentencing. See Brief of Appellee, p. 16. 
Moreover, the State argues that the PSI is not part of the record on 
appeal. The State failed to recognize that the PSI is part of the 
record and is currently before this Court in State v. Powell, Case 
No. 20001054-CA, as explicitly set forth in footnote 5 of the Brief 
of Appellant. The trial court sentenced Mr. Powell in absentia on 
both cases at the same sentencing hearing on October 17, 2000. 
See R. 94, Tab 7). Because of the trial court's obvious confusion 
during sentencing concerning the charges upon which the sentence was 
based, the trial court had to "redo" the sentence, at which time the 
trial court failed to make any reference to the PSI (See R. 94, Tab 
7, pp. 2-3). 
6The State mistakenly refers to the request for sentencing by 
defense counsel as a joint recommendation of defense counsel and the 
prosecution. See Brief of Appellee, p. 15. In fact, the record 
clearly indicates that the request for sentencing was made only by 
Mr. Powell's appointed trial counsel (See R. 94, Tab 7, p, 1, lines 
19-22) . 
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language of Rule 22 (a), which places "an affirmative obligation" 
upon the trial court. Finally, the Wanosik holding is more 
applicable to the instant case inasmuch as Mr. Powell, unlike the 
defendant in Wanosik, was involuntarily absent from sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that forth in the 
previously submitted Brief,7 Daniel B. Powell, respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his conviction of illegal 
possession of a handgun and vacate the invalid sentence and remand 
the case to the trial court for resentencing and for such other 
relief as the Court deems just and appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of July, 2002. 
7IGGINS, P.C. 
Appellant 
7Mr. Powell incorporates the arguments set forth in the Brief of 
Appellant on the trial court's violation of his constitutional right 
to due process in the course of sentencing. 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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